MANAGERIAL POWER AND FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING: A BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Abstract

Fraudulent financial reporting has undermined business integrity, damaged investor trust, and destabilized markets. Despite its significant consequences, the role of managerial power in this context remains inadequately explored. This bibliometric analysis aims to fill this gap by synthesizing existing literature on managerial power and its implications for fraudulent financial reporting. Employing rigorous bibliometric methodologies by comprehensively review a vast array of academic publications across disciplines including finance, accounting, management, and organizational behavior. The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the conceptual frameworks and empirical insights characterizing studies on the relationship between managerial power and fraudulent financial reporting. This study reveals managerial power as a key driver of financial fraud, manifesting through various methods such as earnings manipulation, accounting policy distortions, and selective disclosure. Additionally, this study delves into the determinants of managerial power, including organizational culture, board effectiveness, regulatory contexts, and firm performance. Theoretical foundations from agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, and social exchange theory enrich this examination, offering multifaceted insights into the dynamics of managerial power and financial misconduct. This bibliometric analysis not only identifies emerging trends and research gaps but also underscores practical implications for regulators, auditors, investors, and corporate governance practitioners. By shedding light on the risks associated with managerial power and advocating for enhanced transparency and accountability in financial reporting, this study contributes to both academic scholarship and real-world policy discourse.