THE INFLUENCE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS STRUCTURE ON IRAQI BANKS CREDIT RISK: CONCEPTUAL PAPER

Abstract

The study aims to develop a conceptual framework for the impact of corporate governance factors on credit risks, such as board independence, board expertise, and board subcommittees. This work created a conceptual model within the context of agency theory. Agency theory theorists contend that in their attempts to originate, fund, service, and monitor credit supply, bank management may engage in specific acts or inactions that hurt the loan portfolio, resulting in asset losses. Moreover, while many prior studies have focused on corporate governance, few have focused on bank governance. Banks have different personalities of their own. Bank governance is unique from other companies since the banks are heavily regulated and opaque. In this regard, this study gives critical information to policymakers and adds to the current body of knowledge in the field of bank governance on the credit risk of Iraqi banks.